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INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, many Western governments and organizations have 
pressed developing nations to build robust private property institutions 
and have made large sums available for such property-related projects.1  
One of the central justifications that policymakers and theorists provide 
for this strategy is that it will increase the economic power and freedom 
of individuals, thereby making them less vulnerable to the state.2  
In this Article, I argue that in many cases, precisely the opposite is 
true:  the formalization of private property rights actually makes owners 
more vulnerable to the state and enhances the state’s governance powers 
over them.3  When property rights are formalized, the state gains the 
 
1 On the push to formalize property rights in developing states, see, for example, 
TERRY L. ANDERSON & LAURA E. HUGGINS, PROPERTY RIGHTS:  A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO 
FREEDOM AND PROSPERITY 76-78 (2003), HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH:  THE 
INVISIBLE REVOLUTION IN THE THIRD WORLD 158-63, 177-82 ( June Abbott trans., 1989), 
JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 54-59, 73 (2002), and 
Douglass C. North, The New Institutional Economics and Third World Development, in THE 
NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS AND THIRD WORLD DEVELOPMENT 17, 23 (John Har-
riss et al., eds. 1995).  See also WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2005, at 79-
84 (2004) (“The better protected [property] rights [are] . . . the greater the incentive 
to open new businesses, to invest more . . . and simply to work harder.”); Kevin E. Davis 
& Michael J. Trebilcock, Legal Reforms and Development, 22 THIRD WORLD Q. 21, 23 
(2001) (noting that development economists consider “well defined and alienable pri-
vate property rights” essential to investment and growth); Klaus Deininger & Hans 
Binswanger, The Evolution of the World Bank’s Land Policy:  Principles, Experience, and Future 
Challenges, 14 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 247, 257 (1999) (labeling the absence of per-
manent property rights “a limitation that may reduce investment incentives”); Frequently 
Asked Questions, HERITAGE FOUND., http://www.heritage.org/index/faq (last visited Apr. 
15, 2012) (listing property rights as one of ten indicia of economic freedom). 
2 See, e.g., MARGARET LEVI, OF RULE AND REVENUE 18 (1988) (“[I]ncreasing eco-
nomic power of the mass of the population has led to an increasing political power, 
which has culminated in the granting of universal suffrage . . . .”); cf. JAMES M. 
BUCHANAN, PROPERTY AS A GUARANTOR OF LIBERTY 5-10 (1993) (contrasting the liberty-
enhancing effects of private property with the tragedy of the commons); MILTON 
FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 16 (reissued ed. 1982) (“[I]f economic power is 
kept in separate hands from political power, it can serve as a check and a counter to 
political power.”); RICHARD PIPES, PROPERTY AND FREEDOM 4 (1999) (“[Property] pro-
motes stability and constrains the power of government.”).   
3 I use “the state” to mean a territorially bounded, centrally controlled public 
authority backed by a monopoly on the legitimate use of force.  See MAX WEBER, Politics 
as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER:  ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 77, 78 (H.H. Gerth & C. 
Wright Mills eds. & trans., 1946). 
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power to define the scope of those rights.  This, in turn, provides the 
state with opportunities to impose significant burdens on owners.  A 
system of formal private property rights serves as a mechanism through 
which the state can allocate responsibility to individuals on a mass 
scale for a wide variety of tasks, including some of the state’s core gov-
ernance functions.4  Because many of the state’s core governance func-
tions are territorially defined (such as maintaining peace and order 
within the territory, defending the territory from external threats, and 
providing infrastructure), this phenomenon appears most clearly in 
the case of private property rights in land.5  A network of landowners is 
a useful (and sometimes crucial) tool that lets a state govern locally in 
the farthest reaches of its territory, even when it lacks the capacity or 
will to use other more formal tools for governance, such as governing 
by bureaucracy or license.  Thus, it is useful to think of the state’s 
power to define property rights in a manner that includes obligations 
to carry out core state governance functions as itself a mode of gov-
ernance.  I call this governing through owners. 
Governing through owners is an alternative to other more familiar 
modes of governance.  Emerging or weak states that lack the capacity 
or political will to govern through bureaucracy or license may rely ex-
tensively on owners to carry out the state’s core functions.  But as states 
rely more and more on bureaucrats and licensees, only vestiges of this 
phenomenon may remain, serving as a reminder of the vulnerability of 
owners to the state.6  
There are numerous examples in developed liberal democracies of 
governing through owners on a modest scale.  For instance, snow laws 
require owners to shovel or clear snow from sidewalks that border 
 
4 A closely related and yet distinct phenomenon is one in which states rely on own-
ers’ self-interest to fill in gaps in services that the state otherwise provides.  See Malcolm 
Thorburn, Reinventing the Night-Watchman State?, 60 U. TORONTO L.J. 425, 428 (2010) 
(describing a mode of privatization in which states “may retreat from the business [of 
governance] altogether and leave individuals to buy what they need with their own 
resources”).  
5 See infra Section III.A. 
6 The role of owners is much more complex in modern states with well-developed 
bureaucracies.  Property taxes and special assessments—more common burdens on 
owners in modern states than direct responsibility for government function—represent 
a hybrid form of governance, combining elements of governing through owners and 
governing by bureaucracy or license.  I reserve for another day a full analysis of when 
and why modern liberal democratic states govern through owners. 
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their property.7  But compliance does not entitle owners to greater 
rights to the sidewalk (they cannot, for instance, charge a toll or refuse 
passage) or to special benefits not available to the ordinary sidewalk-
user.  Sidewalk repair in New York City provides a similar, warmer-
weather example of the state pressing owners into its service.  The 
City’s Administrative Code makes commercial property owners re-
sponsible for keeping the sidewalks in front of their properties in good 
repair.8  A recent amendment goes so far as to make owners liable for 
“slip and fall” injuries that occur on public sidewalks in front of their 
buildings and also requires them to purchase insurance to cover those 
damages.9 
 
7 The public nature of these burdens is well-established.  See Willoughby v. City of 
New Haven, 197 A. 85, 87 (Conn. 1937) (“Imposition . . . of a duty to clear walks of 
snow and ice . . . is not sufficient to render the individual, instead of the city, liable for 
injuries sustained by reason of snow.”); see also Taylor v. City of Yonkers, 11 N.E. 642, 
642-43 (N.Y. 1887) (declaring that the responsibility to ensure safe passageways ulti-
mately rests with cities, even when legislation compels citizens to assist in the effort).  
On the role of owners as part of a public snow-removal plan, see Garricks v. City of New 
York, 801 N.E.2d 372, 375 (N.Y. 2003). 
Snow laws mostly take the form of city ordinances or bylaws.  See, e.g., D.C. CODE 
§ 9-601 (2001); N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 16-123 (West, Westlaw through 2011 Local 
Law 29).  In some jurisdictions, the common law also imposes obligations on owners.  
In New Jersey, for example, owners of commercial property have a common law duty to 
clear ice and snow from abutting walks.  Mirza v. Filmore Corp., 456 A.2d 518, 521 (N.J. 
1983).  With a few exceptions, courts have upheld the constitutionality of these ordi-
nances.  Illinois was one of the few states in which courts, at least initially, held snow-
shoveling ordinances to be unconstitutional.  Gridley v. City of Bloomington, 88 Ill. 
554, 556 (1878), overruled by City of Carbondale v. Brewster, 398 N.E.2d 829 (Ill. 
1979); City of Chicago v. O’Brien, 111 Ill. 532, 538 (1884), overruled by Brewster, 398 
N.E.2d 829.  Brewster overruled Gridley, holding that snow-shoveling ordinances were 
proper uses of police power.  398 N.E.2d at 832.  Canadian cities also generally have 
bylaws in place requiring owners to shovel city walks.  See, e.g., Calgary, Alta., Street By-
law, No. 20M88, para. 67 (2011) (Can.), http://www.calgary.ca/CA/city-clerks/ 
Documents/Legislative-services/Bylaws/20m88-Street.pdf; Halifax, N.S., By-law Respect-
ing Streets, By-law No. S-300, para. 4, § 1 (1997) (Can.), http://www.halifax.ca/ 
legislation/bylaws/hrm/documents/By-LawS-300.pdf; Regina, Sask., The Clean Property 
Bylaw, No. 9881, pt. 3, para. 6, § 1 (as amended) (1997) (Can.), http:// 
www.regina.ca/opencms/export/sites/regina.ca/residents/bylaw/.media/pdf/Clean_ 
Property__Bylaw_9881.pdf (Can.); Toronto, Ont., By-law No. 530-1999, § 2(1) (1999) 
(Can.), http://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/bylaws/1999/law0530.pdf. 
8 N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 19-152(a); see also Jay Romano, Sidewalk Liability Hits 
Home, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2003, at RE5.   
9 N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE §§ 7-210 & 7-211; see also Hausser v. Giunta, 669 N.E.2d 
470, 471-72 (N.Y. 1996) (holding that a city may transfer liability for injuries caused by 
unsafe sidewalks from the city to the owner of the abutting property).  Prior to 2003, 
owners were obligated to shovel snow, but courts treated this burden as the delegation 
of a public function that did not change the underlying responsibility of cities for 
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The account I advance here is an important corrective to the idea 
that formal private property straightforwardly increases private power 
and limits the power of the state.10  That idea rests, mistakenly, on a 
single point of comparison:  private versus state ownership.  Of course, 
private power is impaired when the state controls all material re-
sources—in contrast to a situation in which individuals at least have 
some capacity for self-interested uses of things and the accumulation 
of personal wealth.  However, there is another point of comparison, 
between formal private property, set out by the state and frequently 
coupled with responsibility,11 and informal private property,12 where both 
dependence on the state and the state’s power to attach obligations to 
 
sidewalks.  See Garricks, 801 N.E.2d at 375 (noting that an ordinance requiring land-
owners to remove snow from sidewalks “does not relieve the municipality of its” expo-
sure to liability). 
10 In an influential book, James C. Scott has argued that high modernist states sim-
plify and standardize property rights primarily to gain a better appreciation of the 
wealth of their subjects.  See JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE:  HOW CERTAIN 
SCHEMES TO IMPROVE THE HUMAN CONDITION HAVE FAILED 36 (1998) (“The fiscal or 
administrative goal toward which all modern states aspire is to measure, codify, and 
simplify land tenure . . . .”).  My account shares some of the aims of Scott’s work in that 
it too attempts to illuminate some of the ways that states use and benefit from property 
systems.  Unlike Scott, however, my concern is how states lacking the ability or political 
will to govern through purpose-built offices typical of high modernist, bureaucratic 
states use a network of owners to carry out their purposes.   
11 That private ownership often comes with duties is not a new claim.  See, e.g., A.M. 
Honoré, Ownership (“[L]imitations on the use of things are . . . so obviously essential to 
the existence of an orderly community . . . .”), in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 
107, 123 (A.G. Guest ed., 1961).  On the normative foundations for the obligations of 
ownership in virtue ethics, see Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in Amer-
ican Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745, 753-54 (2009), and Eduardo M. Peñalver, 
Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 821, 869-70 (2009).  What is new is to view the bur-
dens of ownership through the lens of state power and functioning, which reveals a 
mode of governance that contrasts with other forms of governance, such as governing 
by bureaucracy or license. 
12 While formal private property rights are those that the state recognizes, defines, 
and enforces, informal property rights depend on nonstate collective-action mecha-
nisms for their definition and protection.  See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT 
LAW:  HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 131 (1991) (discussing private enforcement 
mechanisms); infra note 83 and accompanying text; see also Larissa Katz, Red Tape and 
Gridlock, 23 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 99, 104 (2010) (“[I]n most of the world, people 
control resources without recourse to the . . . state.  In some cases . . . they turn to local 
collective action mechanisms . . . .”); Carol M. Rose, Privatization-—The Road to Democracy?, 
50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 691, 703 (2006) (describing formal private property as “a creature 
of the state”).  On the success of informal property regimes, see ELINOR OSTROM, GOV-
ERNING THE COMMONS:  THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 
(1991) and Carol M.  Rose, Property as the Keystone Right?, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 329, 
334 (1996).  But see infra note 84 and accompanying text. 
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property-holding are diminished or absent altogether.  When seen in 
opposition to informal private property holding, formal private property 
may increase the extent to which owners are vulnerable to the state.13  
The phenomenon of governing through owners suggests that the 
formalization of private property rights often enhances state power, 
but there is yet a further wrinkle:  the usefulness of owners to the state 
does not always work to the disadvantage of owners.  In some cases, it 
may also empower them vis-à-vis the state.  The state’s dependence on 
owners to carry out these governance functions throughout its territory 
may offset owners’ vulnerability to the state.  Of course, how much 
power owners hold by being in charge of state functions depends 
enormously on the details of the situation.  When there are relatively 
few owners, or when owners are able to coordinate their efforts, the 
state might find that in order to govern effectively it has no alternative 
but to give in to some of their demands.   
The balance of power between states and owners is thus much 
more complicated than the models that currently dominate property 
theory and international development suggest.  These models insist 
that individual owners are least vulnerable to the power of the state 
where there is a clear and rigorously protected “private sphere” in 
which owners are free to set self-serving agendas for things and to  
accumulate personal wealth.  But in some cases, at least, owners might 
be at their most powerful when the state extensively relies on them to 
carry out core governance functions.  At its most harmonious, the 
state-owner relationship is one of mutual dependence, where the state 
depends on owners to carry out its core business throughout its terri-
tory just as much as owners depend on the state to protect their prop-
erty rights.   
This Article proceeds as follows.  Parts I and II explain how and 
why owners are liable to be used as tools for state governance.  My 
model of state-owner relations emerges from two important conceptual 
starting points:  first, the nature of ownership as an office through 
which the state assigns burdens; and second, the conditions of a terri-
torially defined state, namely, the establishment of basic governmental 
 
13 Of concern here is how formal private property rights affect state power.  On the 
personal and social benefits that secure formal ownership can confer, see MARTHA C. 
NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT:  THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH 156-57, 
281-82 (2000), JEAN-PHILLIPE PLATTEAU, INSTITUTIONS, SOCIAL NORMS, AND ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT 134-51 (2000), and Erica Field, Entitled to Work:  Urban Property Rights and 
Labor Supply in Peru, 122 Q.J. ECON. 1561, 1591-93 (2007).  
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functions throughout its territory.  Parts III and IV consider what gov-
erning through owners means for the balance of power between states 
and owners.  Conventional wisdom is that individuals gain greater 
power and independence vis-à-vis the state through a clearly defined 
and protected private sphere.  But this view does not account for the 
vulnerability of owners to the state and the phenomenon of governing 
through owners.  Moreover, it obscures two crucial forms of protection 
against state predation:  mutual dependence of owners and states 
when states rely on owners to govern and retreat from the state to an 
informal sphere. 
I.  OFFICES AND THE DISTRIBUTION  
OF RESPONSIBILITY 
The core insight of this Article is that a system of formal property 
rights is a sometimes dangerously convenient mechanism for the state to 
offload some of the burdens of government onto the shoulders of indi-
viduals.14  Put another way, when the state formalizes property rights, it 
acquires a mechanism for pressing owners into its service at low mar-
ginal cost:  it is able to convert an established system of property rights 
into a network of local offices.  Governing through owners is an alter-
native to governing through bureaucracy or license.  All are ways of 
distributing responsibility for state functions to large numbers of peo-
ple.15  Government by bureaucracy or license can be more closely fitted 
with the jobs that need to get done—but these systems also require the 
state to set up a second set of offices (besides ownership).  A system of 
formal private property rights enables the state to function beyond the 
effective reach of its centralized institutions and in the absence of will-
ing licensees.  By imposing governance obligations on owners, the 
 
14 The question I address thus concerns not so much who benefits from state power 
or who controls the state but rather what kind of power the state has and what institutions 
affect it.  See, e.g., Theda Skocpol, Bringing the State Back In:  Strategies of Analysis in Current 
Research (discussing the “capacities of states to implement their policies” (emphasis omit-
ted)), in BRINGING THE STATE BACK IN 3, 15-18 (Peter B. Evans et al. eds., 1985). 
15 All states act through people, whether they are officials under the control of the 
state, licensees, or other collaborators.  One variable that informs whether the state 
relies on officials, as opposed to licensees or collaborators, is the availability of willing 
collaborators.  See THOMAS ERTMAN, BIRTH OF THE LEVIATHAN:  BUILDING STATES AND 
REGIMES IN MEDIEVAL AND EARLY MODERN EUROPE (1997) (noting that post–dark age 
states in continental Europe built up bureaucracies because they lacked trustworthy 
local collaborators); see also LEVI, supra note 2, at 10-11 (discussing the interactions 
among “rulers,” their agents, and their constituencies and describing the tendency of 
dictators to rely on officials). 
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state is able to do things locally that are basic to its claims of authority 
within a given territory:  it can ensure that peace and order are main-
tained, that roads are built, and that frontiers are defended, all by 
coupling these obligations with the office of ownership.   
In what follows, I present a model of state-owner relations that 
reveals what makes owners so attractive as a tool for governance and 
what makes them particularly vulnerable to being drafted in this way.  
In so doing, I present the balance of power between state and owners 
in a new light.  Why are owners such appealing targets for mandatory 
collaboration with the state?  One reason is the nature of ownership as 
an office that allows the state essentially to mass produce individual 
responsibility.16  A system of formal private property rights provides the 
framework for states to assign responsibilities to owners, an alternative 
to governing through bureaucracy or by license.      
A.  Features of an Office 
The position of owner invites responsibility for state functions, 
such as building infrastructure, defending frontiers, and even adjudi-
cating disputes and maintaining peace and order.  The reason for this 
lies primarily in the nature of ownership as an office that shares (or 
even anticipates) features of purpose-built offices that convey special-
ized roles in more developed systems of governance.17  
By looking carefully at the concept of offices and the large-scale 
systematicity it enables, we set the groundwork for understanding how 
and why states offload the burdens of government onto owners.  Offices 
allow a special kind of planning to take place:  through a network of 
 
16 States face special challenges in holding individuals responsible.  As a historical 
matter, collective responsibility seems to have been the starting point for Western polit-
ical authorities, even after the concept of individual responsibility existed in the 
Church and the family.  See HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION:  THE FOR-
MATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 185-86 (1983) (distinguishing between 
“offense[s] against society,” historically the subject of secular enforcement, and indi-
vidual sins, which the Church punished); FINBARR MCAULEY & J. PAUL MCCUTCHEON, 
CRIMINAL LIABILITY 11 (2000) (noting the Church’s interest in individual, as opposed 
to social, responsibility); cf. ALAN MACFARLANE, THE ORIGINS OF ENGLISH INDIVIDUAL-
ISM:  THE FAMILY, PROPERTY, AND SOCIAL TRANSITION 111 (1979) (discussing the legal 
relationships between individual property owners, their land, and their families in 
twelfth-century England). 
17 This concept of offices contrasts with the Weberian idea of patrimonial offices, 
which are inheritable, personal, and legitimately for profit.  See 2 MAX WEBER, ECONO-
MY AND SOCIETY:  AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY 1028-32 (Guenther Roth & 
Claus Wittich eds., Ephraim Fischoff et al. trans., Univ. of Cal. Press 1978).   
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offices, the state can allocate responsibilities prospectively, systemati-
cally, and at mass scale.18  Offices convey authority and responsibility to 
perform a specific role in a larger system or practice.  A network of 
offices, very importantly, forms a blueprint for distributing responsibil-
ity.  Individuals then slot themselves into this network as officeholders.   
 At the outset, there is a distinction between “mere roles” individu-
als might assume, on the one hand, and “offices,” on the other hand, 
to which roles and responsibilities attach.  Offices set out roles for their 
holders, but not all roles are embedded within offices.  Three features of 
offices help distinguish them from (mere) roles people might assume or 
assign one another:  offices are positions of authority that are (1) ra-
tional parts of a system or practice, (2) separable from their holder,19 
and, (3) stable or enduring in nature.  While roles may come and go with 
the people who perform them, offices remain even when unfilled.20  
A network of offices represents a rational distribution of authority 
and responsibility in the following sense.  Offices are defined (or ra-
tionalized) in terms of their place within some system or practice—-for 
example, a social, political, or religious practice.  Even when offices 
are vacant, they represent a fixed way of divvying up authority and re-
sponsibility in keeping with that system or practice.  Of course, we can 
assign mere roles to people to advance a specific, well-worked-out 
plan, but that role may nonetheless fall short of an “office” simply be-
cause it is not defined in terms of an ongoing system or practice.  Im-
agine you are planning a camping trip with a group of friends (to take 
 
18 See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY:  ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY 
OF LAW 212 (rev. ed. 1973) (discussing prospective versus retrospective responsibility or 
responsibility that arises as events unfold); John Gardner, Hart and Feinberg on Responsi-
bility (discussing the distinctions and interactions between responsibility and liability), 
in THE LEGACY OF H.L.A. HART:  LEGAL, POLITICAL, AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY 121, 133-
34 (Matthew H. Kramer et al. eds., 2008).   
19 On the impersonal and stable nature of offices generally, see SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, 
LEGALITY 75 (2011). 
20 I have elsewhere made the claim that ownership is an office precisely because it 
is designed to endure even as holders of the position come and go.  See Larissa Katz, 
The Moral Paradox of Adverse Possession:  Sovereignty and Revolution in Property Law, 55 
MCGILL L.J. 47, 78 (2010) (“[T]he law’s most pressing concern is not who is owner but 
rather that the office of owner is filled.”); see also H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS ON BENTHAM:  
STUDIES IN JURISPRUDENCE AND POLITICAL THEORY 208 (1982) (describing Bentham’s 
view of conveyance, namely that “[t]he old owner . . . appoints the transferee to the 
‘office’ of owner of the property”).  For a conceptual analysis of ownership affirming 
the nature of ownership as an office, see Christopher Essert, The Office of Ownership 
33-34 (Mar. 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
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an example from H.L.A. Hart).21  It may be that the plan requires some 
people to assume positions of authority.  For instance, someone may 
need to be in charge of the route or setting up camp at night.  Natu-
rally, we might agree in advance who will do each job.  Johnny, in this 
example, might be in charge of setting up camp.  When we have a very 
detailed idea of what our plan requires of Johnny, we might speak of 
Johnny as having a role to play.  But it would be quite improper to 
speak of Johnny as occupying an office because there is no ongoing 
practice or system of which that role is a part. 
 The second crucial feature of offices is their impersonal quality.  
An office is necessarily separable from the person who holds it.  Offices 
convey a set of rights, duties, powers, and privileges to whoever hap-
pens to occupy the position.  I call this the “impersonality thesis.”22  An 
important implication of the impersonality thesis is that an office can 
endure as office-holders come and go even when there is no one in 
the position.  If an office falls vacant, the office still functions as a 
placeholder in that system.  For example, judges have a position in a 
system of justice defined by their authority and responsibility to adju-
dicate the cases that come before them.23  If some of those judgeships 
are vacant (such as in the U.S. context, when there are delays in con-
firmations), the judgeships do not disappear nor do the contours of 
the system of justice change.  The offices remain, placeholders in that 
system, until they are filled. 
The impersonality of offices is another basis on which some roles 
can be distinguished from offices.  Some roles depend in a normatively 
significant way on the personal identity of their holder.  Consider fam-
ily roles.  Not just anyone can be a child’s mother:  it is a role (con-
cerned with loving, nurturing, and raising a child) that is bound up 
with a specific person.  It would be possible to set up a legal office of 
 
21 See HART, supra note 18, at 212. 
22 The separability of offices generally from the office-holder is also a well-known 
feature of ownership.  See J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 112 (1997) 
(“What distinguishes a property right is not just that they are only contingently ours, but 
that they might just as well be someone else’s.”); Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Prop-
erty Law, 58 U. TORONTO L.J. 275, 306 (2008) (distinguishing between the office-holder 
and the office itself); Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV.  1719, 
1782 & n.213, 1792 & n.251 (2004) (citing Penner for the idea that property rights and 
obligations are impersonal and separable from any particular owner). 
23 On the public nature of offices, and for the view that “an office is any position in 
which the political community as a whole takes an interest, choosing the person who 
holds it or regulating the procedures by which he is chosen,” see MICHAEL WALZER, 
SPHERES OF JUSTICE:  A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 129 (1983). 
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guardian, of course, to which many of the responsibilities of a parent 
could be attached.  But a mother’s role is inseparable from her personal 
identity.  It is thus possible to speak of a mother’s role in the rearing of a 
child but not of the office of motherhood.   
Stability is a third feature of offices.  An office is a stable position 
of authority, not an ad hoc role.  Imagine that a ship is going down at 
sea and the captain and crew are immediately swept overboard.  A very 
forceful and charismatic soul suddenly and unexpectedly takes charge 
of directing passengers to lifeboats as the ship is sinking.  He proves to 
be very effective at shepherding his fellow passengers safely onto the 
lifeboats.  He assumes command and is accorded deference by the 
others because of his obvious ability to handle the situation.  Our hero 
performs a function spontaneously as events unfold, but he does not 
have a stable position in an ongoing system or practice.  He is not the 
captain or a member of the crew, who we might say hold offices in 
some established maritime system.  Nor is he even like the passenger 
in the exit row on an airplane, who has a clearly defined role agreed 
upon ex ante that takes hold in the event of emergency.   The ad hoc 
nature of our hero’s role means it completely lacks the stability associ-
ated with offices.  As soon as the emergency is over, the role disap-
pears.  It is not just that it is vacated by our hero; it does not even 
notionally occupy a place in an existing system or practice.  
The chief strength of a network of offices is that it enables states to 
allocate responsibility systematically and on a mass scale even as the 
people who hold those offices come and go.  Of course there is a very  
important weakness inherent in attaching burdens to offices too:  the 
actual work attached to an office gets done only if there is someone in 
the office.  Offices that are voluntary must come with significant in-
centives to enter office and significant obstacles to leaving office if 
they are to serve as effective governance tools.24  I later consider this 
weakness in the context of ownership but first I elaborate on one of 
the crucial advantages of a system of offices:  how it enables states to 
allocate responsibility prospectively and on a mass scale. 
B.  Mass Producing Responsibility 
When the state governs through owners, it grafts state functions 
onto a system of formal private property rights.  Assume for a moment 
 
24 As we will see, infra Part IV, most systems of property undertake to make the posi-
tion of owner as sticky as possible to limit the possibility of exit. 
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that the state has the general authority to obligate its subjects to en-
gage in some activity, such as to shovel public sidewalks.  How is its 
authority enhanced when it is able to attach that obligation to a legal 
office, like ownership?  Why is it so much more effective to couple 
state burdens with private rights, rather than impose standalone obli-
gations?  I argue that governing through owners enables states to mass 
produce prospective responsibility while picking out with some preci-
sion who is obligated to do what. 
Assume that it is sometimes in a state’s interest to hold individuals 
prospectively responsible to do or not to do something.  If the state 
wants to have someone take on a role, it needs some mechanism for 
singling him or her out so that the job actually gets done.  Of course, a 
state might instead obligate groups of people collectively to perform 
some function.  Or it might hold certain people responsible retrospec-
tively in response to the occurrence of some undesirable event (using 
some formula, such as the lowest cost avoider, to figure out on whom 
best to pin responsibility, ex post facto).  But these strategies, although 
they avoid the problem of identifying who is responsible ex ante, limit 
the state’s ability to effectively distribute the burdens of governing.25  
Individual and prospective responsibility requires that the law identify 
the individual obligee with precision, so that she knows not only what 
is to be done but also that she is the one responsible for doing it ex 
ante.  Though normally viewed as a requirement of justice,26 it is also a 
practical requirement necessary for the effectiveness of law. 
How, then, might the state identify the responsible actor? One 
possibility is for the state to allocate responsibility by picking out the 
specific individual by name, as is done in private contexts where our 
plans require us to assign roles and responsibilities.  This suggestion is 
feasible, perhaps, in the personal social context.  Assuming a person 
does not have an extremely active and volatile social life, her circle of 
friends is likely small and stable enough that she and her friends might 
assign roles and responsibilities for personal activities, such as dinner 
parties, camping trips, or playdates, simply by naming the person in 
 
25 Indeed, my model would suggest that states will rely more on collective responsi-
bility in the absence of a system of formal private property rights.  See, e.g., Richard A.  
Posner, A Theory of Primitive Society, with Special Reference to Law, 23 J.L. & ECON. 1, 43-44 
(1980)(noting that, in “the absence of effective government,” collective responsibility is 
the only way to enforce societal norms). 
26 See, e.g., LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 39 (rev. ed. 1969) (“[T]here can 
be no rational ground for asserting that a man can have a moral obligation to obey a 
legal rule that does not exist, or is kept secret from him . . . .”).   
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charge.27  This strategy, however, would be too costly for the state to 
adopt.  Assigning roles by name imposes information and operational 
costs that increase with the scale of the plans.28  Offices and office-
holding provide a tool for governance that enables the state to distrib-
ute roles and responsibilities systematically and on a mass scale.  Cou-
pling state functions with legal positions such as ownership allows the 
state to hold specific individuals prospectively responsible without iden-
tifying each by name.29  To fully understand the value of prospective 
individual responsibility that is nevertheless impersonal and mediated 
through offices, consider the following scenarios. 
Scenario A:  A fire breaks out in a packed theater that has no  
assigned seats.  A rule posted at the front door announces that, as a 
condition of entry, everyone is responsible for putting out fires.  At the 
first smell of smoke, mayhem breaks out as everyone tries to put out 
the fire simultaneously without anyone to coordinate their efforts.  
The manager (rightly) concludes that a house rule that obligates every-
one to put out the fire does not assign roles or responsibility effectively.   
Scenario B:  The next evening, there are new house rules.  Now, as 
a condition of entry, everyone must accept the manager’s authority to 
allocate responsibility to pay for any damage caused by a fire to the 
person whom he determines was “best placed” to prevent or to limit 
the damage.  That night a fire breaks out again.  Some members of the 
audience get into an argument over who should be liable, while others 
slip away, figuring that they are unlikely to be considered “best placed” 
to put the fire out and anyway can afford to pay if they are.  No one in 
the end undertakes to extinguish it.     
 
27 See supra Section I.A. 
28 See Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1330 (1993) 
(“[T]ransaction costs tend to increase with the number of individuals involved.”).  With 
technological advances, state-citizen relations are becoming more intimate and, some 
scholars would say, inappropriately so.  See Malcolm Thorburn, Identification, Surveillance 
and Profiling:  On the Use and Abuse of Citizen Data (discussing how states use technology 
and personal data to manage their subjects), in SEEKING SECURITY:  PRE-EMPTING THE 
COMMISSION OF CRIMINAL HARMS 15, 27-28 (G.R. Sullivan & Ian Dennis eds., forthcom-
ing 2012). 
29 Cf. Jane Caplan, “This or That Particular Person”:  Protocols of Identification in Nineteenth-
Century Europe” (discussing, in the context of various European countries’ restrictions 
on personal names, the way in which standardization and categorization permit greater 
and cheaper state oversight), in DOCUMENTING INDIVIDUAL IDENTITY:  THE DEVELOP-
MENT OF STATE PRACTICES IN THE MODERN WORLD 49 ( Jane Caplan & John Torpey 
eds., 2001). 
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Scenario C:  Now imagine that the theater comes under new man-
agement.  The house draws up a seating chart and assigns seats at the 
point of sale.  The new rule is that a person is responsible for extin-
guishing any fire that starts under her seat.  Thus, if a fire breaks out 
under seat J3, the occupant of J3, whoever she happens to be, is obli-
gated to put it out.  In order to allocate the burden of fire control pro-
spectively to a clearly ascertainable person, the manager need only 
ensure that someone occupies J3.  This rule, that the occupant of J3 is 
responsible for putting out fires under J3, assigns roles, ex ante, to 
specific individuals and identifies those individuals with precision, but 
it does so without naming them. 
When might the state need to look behind the office to the identity 
of the officeholder?  The state may require that a name be attached to 
the position for enforcement purposes.30  The kinds of concerns that 
drive the state’s enforcement mechanisms—such as its interest at the 
point of enforcement to identify and engage with actual, named indi-
viduals—are quite different from the concerns that drive the state’s 
governance strategies.  A state relies primarily on the exercise of its 
authority to carry out its ends.  An effective state, like an effective par-
ent, resorts to coercion only rarely.31  Coercion is a backstop, not a 
primary tool for governance.32  For the purposes of governance, a state 
effectively assigns roles and responsibilities by providing people with 
just enough information to know what is required of them.  At least 
initially, a state need not interest itself in the identity of the obligee.  
That information becomes relevant only later if the obligee fails to 
 
30 Indeed, undue concern with the problem of identification is often a symptom of 
the mistaken view that the main business of the state is the enforcement of commands.  
Thus Jeremy Bentham found the common law practice of not regulating or registering 
citizens’ identity particularly problematic.  See JEREMY BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF PENAL 
LAW (1843) (“The greater number of offences would not be committed, if the delin-
quents did not hope to remain unknown.”), reprinted in 1 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BEN-
THAM 557, 557 ( John Bowring ed., 1962).  For a discussion of common law and civilian 
practices of surveillance and identification, see Thorburn, supra note 28, at 23-25. 
31 See LESLIE GREEN, THE AUTHORITY OF THE STATE 71 (1988) (“As a psychological 
or sociological thesis about the sources of compliance, the view that the state is essen-
tially a coercive order is unsupported by the evidence.”). 
32 The importance of coercion is to “assure the law-abiding that the recalcitrant will 
not take them for suckers.”  Legal Obligation and Authority, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. 
(Dec. 29, 2003), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-obligation.  But cf. YORAM 
BARZEL, A THEORY OF THE STATE:  ECONOMIC RIGHTS, LEGAL RIGHTS, AND THE SCOPE 
OF THE STATE 17 (2002) (“Power, especially in the context of the state, is usually viewed 
as the ability to inflict physical harm.”). 
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perform, at which point linking offices to named individuals reduces 
enforcement costs.33   
But when it comes to the office of ownership, the problem of 
personal identification is less acute, even at the point of enforce-
ment.  That is because the state has the option of crafting remedies 
that operate in rem.  The forfeiture of the thing itself, temporarily or 
permanently, or even the threat of forfeiture, enforces the obligations 
of the office no matter who holds it.34 
II.  THE USE OF PRIVATE RIGHTS TO CONVEY STATE BURDENS:   
SOME ADVANTAGES  
I now consider more closely why ownership is a kind of office and 
what these reasons reveal about its suitability as a mechanism for gov-
ernance.  Ownership has many of the characteristics of an office—it is 
an impersonal and stable position of authority that can be rationalized 
as part of an ongoing system for allocating decisional control with re-
spect to things.  But it is not purpose-built for the allocation of state 
burdens.  How and why, then, do states govern through owners? 
A.  Commandeering a Preexisting System of Rights  
Ownership is a position of authority, designed for other purposes, 
but which states can commandeer to achieve the purposes of govern-
ment.  When a state governs through owners, the state couples a sys-
tem of governance with a system of property rights instead of creating 
new offices dedicated to the performance of state functions.35  Owners 
 
33 For an example of identification requirements for land registration, see SUSANA 
LASTARRIA-CORNHIEL & GRENVILLE BARNES, LAND TENURE CTR., FORMALIZING INFOR-
MALITY:  THE PRAEDIAL REGISTRATION SYSTEM IN PERU 26, 28, 32 (1999).  The identifi-
cation of owners may have other purposes related to the enforcement of private contracts.  
On the accountability of owners to others through registration, see HERNANDO DE SOTO, 
THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL:  WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERY-
WHERE ELSE 54-56 (2000).  For a critique of this account, see Kevin E. Davis, The Rules of 
Capitalism, 22 THIRD WORLD Q. 675 (2001) (reviewing DE SOTO, supra). 
34 English law has long included forfeiture laws.  In feudal law, escheat for felonies 
gave the Crown possession of land for a year and a day.  See A.W.B. SIMPSON, AN INTRO-
DUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF THE LAND LAW 19-20 (1961).  And of course liens are, in 
effect, threats of the loss of possession or ownership in the event of nonperformance.  
See Kevin E. Davis, The Effects of Forfeiture on Third Parties, 48 MCGILL L.J. 183, 194 (2003) 
(providing examples of when, under Canadian law, true owners may have to bear the 
burden of forfeiture even when not complicit in crime). 
35 Unlike offices purpose-built for government work, the system of rewards that 
attaches to ownership is not directly keyed to the performance of public roles and 
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may have powers that complement the tasks the state assigns them; for 
example, owners charged with preserving some habitat for an endan-
gered species may depend on their exclusionary powers to do so.  But 
in other contexts, the powers attendant to ownership—for instance, 
rights of noninterference, privileges of use, and the powers to give, sell 
or share access with others—may be of little help in carrying out the 
tasks of governance.36  For instance, owners may be obligated to carry 
out tasks outside the physical boundaries of their property, such as 
building or maintaining public roads adjacent to their land.  In these 
(and other) cases, their obligations stem from their positions as owners 
but are not fully supported by the rights, powers, and privileges that 
come with ownership.   
Unlike offices that are tailor-made to form a part of a system of 
governance (namely, bureaucratic offices), ownership remains a dual-
purpose position.  The position of owner is forced to accommodate 
both personal uses, enabling owners to set self-serving agendas for 
things, and political uses, enabling states to hold individuals responsible 
for government functions.  In the context of a system of governance, 
ownership is perhaps better understood as a proto-office, to distinguish it 
from a specialized office dedicated to the performance of state functions.   
Ownership, it may be thought, is ill-suited as a tool for governance 
precisely because it is not purpose-built to convey governmental re-
sponsibilities.  But while this is true to some extent, there are also 
many advantages, from the state’s perspective, to governing through 
owners.  There are significant costs to organizing a functioning bureau-
cracy.  It takes time, expertise, and funds.  In addition, there are many 
problems, such as corruption, that bedevil the efficient functioning of 
bureaucratic governments.  Bureaucracies cannot be built overnight.37  
Thus, another advantage of governing through a network of owners is 
precisely that a system of private property rights has a separate and 
independent rationale—the creation of a private sphere for its hold-
er.  Rather than creating a second system of authority dedicated to 
 
responsibilities.  Owners do not collect a salary or fee for performing their responsibili-
ties.  Rather, their reward is their tenure or the occupation of the position itself and its 
particular rights, privileges, and powers. 
36 By contrast, governing by license authorizes private individuals to exercise lim-
ited and precisely defined state authority.  See MICHAEL J. BRADDICK, STATE FORMATION 
IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND 40-42, 88 (2000). 
37 Cf. MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & RONALD J. DANIELS, RULE OF LAW REFORM AND  
DEVELOPMENT (2008) (discussing persisting uncertainty in determining what institu-
tions best foster a developing society). 
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advancing the aims of government, the state simply repurposes an 
existing system of rights. 
 A significant downside to governing through ownership, however, 
is that it entails relying on voluntary posts for the fulfilment of core 
state functions.  Unlike other, more general legal positions, such as 
citizenship, ownership is voluntarily assumed.  While many systems of 
property rights work hard to limit exit from the position of owner, very 
few systems obligate individuals to take up the position.38  And we can 
relinquish the position of owner by transferring or releasing our rights 
to someone else or, to the extent that abandonment is legally possible, 
by leaving the thing ownerless.39  Thus, the voluntariness of ownership 
may present a problem for states that set the price of ownership too 
high:  governing through owners is only possible where there are actu-
ally owners in place to do the work of the state. 
But it is important not to overstate the problem that the voluntari-
ness of ownership presents—-at least in the absence of an informal 
sector.  If the state is able to prevent the movement of the objects of 
property into the informal sector, the exit of people from the formal 
sector is unlikely too.  Where there is no viable informal sector (more 
on this below), the voluntariness of ownership only inhibits states to the 
extent that owners are willing to exercise their option to be property-
less.  That is, people might choose not to be owners.  But where that 
choice means giving up entirely on a private sphere, the scope for exit 
is limited considerably.   
B. Vulnerability and State Leverage 
Because owners are dependent on the state to enforce the private 
benefits of ownership, they are vulnerable to the state’s ability to draft 
them into its service.40  This reality is not a normative claim about the 
legitimacy of the state’s power to define the burdens of ownership.41  
 
38 We are not born owners.  It is a status that requires some kind of acceptance.   
39 See Eduardo M. Peñalver, The Illusory Right to Abandon, 109 MICH. L. REV. 191, 
200-02 (2010) (discussing the traditional limitations on abandonment). 
40 The state’s role in protecting property rights is what makes these rights “formal.”  
See supra note 12. 
41 The state’s power to coerce, which owners invoke in demanding the protection 
of their rights, cannot legitimately be applied in support of rights that the state does 
not define.  The state’s power—and duty—to define what it enforces rests on the basic 
idea that the state acts legitimately only when it acts without bias and according to rules 
knowable ex ante.  If it were otherwise, then the state would be no more than a hired 
gun, doing the bidding of private individuals who sought to dominate others by setting 
Katz Revised Final.docx (DO NOT DELETE)5/30/2012 7:57 PM 
2046 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 160: 2029 
 
Rather, it is a descriptive claim about the leverage a state has over 
owners when it serves as their protector.  Without competition from 
other collective-action mechanisms for the authorization and enforce-
ment of property rights, the state is able to act like a monopolist:  it 
can raise the price of ownership by attaching more burdens to the po-
sition of ownership without losing “customers.”  
The state’s power over owners may take different forms, but, in any 
form, owners depend on the state for their property rights and so are 
vulnerable to the state’s demands.  States may rely on “super-owner” 
status to define the burdens of ownership.42  In its capacity as “super-
owner,” a state delegates ownership authority in the form of a grant, to 
which it then attaches terms and conditions, just as a private property 
owner might.  This is the most straightforward way for a state to lever-
age a system of property rights to create a system of governance, and it 
was a common strategy for emerging states43 in feudal societies.44  This 
phenomenon appeared most clearly in the practice of “dependent” 
land holding in feudal systems, in which land was held by private indi-
viduals, instead of the King, in exchange for (mainly) military service.45  
A modern day version is seen in the exactions municipalities claim 
from developers in exchange for what we might think of as “more” 
 
the terms under which they would be required to act.  But I do not aim to develop this 
normative claim here:  this Article is primarily a conceptual and descriptive enterprise. 
42 I am making this claim descriptively.  For a normative account of this concept, 
see, for example, ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM:  KANT’S LEGAL AND POLITI-
CAL PHILOSOPHY 239 (2009).  In English common law, the doctrine of tenure implies 
that everyone’s property is ultimately held for the Crown.  See CHARLES HAPRUM ET AL., 
THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 22 (7th ed. 2008) (“[A]ll land in England is owned by the 
Crown.”).  But see SIMPSON, supra note 34, at 44 (calling the notion that the Crown 
“owns” the land “very modern”). 
43 Common lawyers typically insist that the common law does not have the idea of a 
state.  But whatever the legal status of the “Crown” in English law, I am referring here 
to the state as a political entity.  See WEBER, supra note 3, at 77-78 (“[A] state is a human 
community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force 
within a given territory.”). 
44 This practice is not solely feudal, however.  See HENDRIK HARTOG, PUBLIC PROP-
ERTY AND PRIVATE POWER:  THE CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK IN AMERICAN 
LAW, 1730–1870, at 44-59 (1983) (discussing New York City’s development of its water-
front using the “Planning by Granting” method, by which the City sought to build up 
those areas through the distribution of development rights).      
45 SIMPSON, supra note 34, at 3.  On the nature of the feudal relationship generally, 
see S.F.C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 178-80 (1969), 
THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 506-20 (5th ed. 
1956), and FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF 
ENGLISH LAW 4 (2d ed. 1968). 
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property rights—an enlarged sphere of private authority.  The direct 
and simple form of leverage that a state has as super-owner implies 
certain limits on the power of the state vis-à-vis owners:  the state, like 
any owner, must have something to give away—something that can be 
the subject matter of a grant.46  The power to impose terms runs out at 
the point the state has nothing more to offer.47  
The leverage the state has over owners thus comes from its power 
to define the rights it enforces.  But the state is not restricted to taking 
the form of a super-owner setting the terms and conditions of a grant.  
The burdens of ownership in modern states are typically the products 
of a state’s police powers, the general authority to govern in the public 
interest.48  For instance, as previously noted, many municipalities in 
the United States and Canada have enacted laws that make owners re-
sponsible for shovelling sidewalks and building and repairing roads.49  
Thus, governing through owners, though perhaps most extensively 
used by feudal states, exists in the modern bureaucratic state as well. 
In this section, I have argued that a network of owners serves a dual 
purpose:  it is an institution designed to allocate self-serving, agenda-
setting authority to individuals, but it is also a mechanism for distrib-
uting state responsibility systematically and on a large scale throughout 
the state’s territory.  Such a network simultaneously empowers private 
owners and lets the state govern through them.  Owners’ dependence 
on the state for the enforcement of their private rights renders them 
vulnerable to state demands.  I next consider the special advantages to 
the state of governing through owners rather than through any other 
position of private authority.   
 
46 Cf. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS 303-08 (3d ed. 
2005) (arguing that zoning does not reflect actual land use plans but is often much 
more restrictive so that cities can hand out additional property rights to owners in  
exchange for further exactions). 
47 Again, in the context of exactions, the limited nature of this form of leverage 
means that cities have a hard time getting developers to perform long-term functions, 
such as the upkeep and maintenance of transit-related infrastructure.   
48 See generally MARKUS DIRK DUBBER, THE POLICE POWER:  PATRIARCHY AND THE 
FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (2005) (providing a history of the police 
power in the United States); Thorburn, supra note 4, at 431 (adopting Blackstone’s 
definition of the “public police” as “the due regulation and domestic order of the 
kingdom” (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *162)). 
49 See Ryan v. City of Schenectady, 154 N.Y.S. 890, 892 (Sup. Ct. 1915) (likening the 
requirement to remove snow to “a police regulation”); supra notes 7-9 and accompany-
ing text. 
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III.  WHY OWNERS?  LOCATION, LOCATION, LOCATION 
Thus far, I have shown why it is sometimes to the state’s advantage 
to couple obligations with legal positions like ownership rather than 
simply imposing standalone obligations on the population at large or 
naming individual obligees.  But why is ownership in particular such a 
useful category?  Put another way, there are general advantages to be 
had from bundling obligations with legal positions generally, yet we do 
not routinely see state functions coupled to other legal positions.  Not 
everyone licensed to practice medicine in the state of New York, for 
instance, must form road-repair crews as a condition of the license.    
What is it in the nature of property rights, then, that leads states to 
govern through owners rather than through doctors?  The answer is 
clearest in the context of property rights in land.  While all forms of 
property rights enforced by the state give the state some leverage to 
impose burdens,50 property rights in land have a special feature that 
enhances their use as a tool for governance:  they are defined in terms 
of their location within the state’s territory.  When this special feature 
of property rights is considered in conjunction with what I will argue is 
the territorial nature of core state functions—building infrastructure, 
maintaining peace and order, and defending borders—the reason 
states find it attractive to govern through owners becomes clearer.  This 
connection between private property rights and a particular space in a 
state’s territory is what makes governing through owners so effective. 
A.  The Territorial Nature of Core State Functions  
The territorial dimension of property rights is so important for 
governance purposes because states are themselves defined territorially.  
The territorial component of land ownership makes it a particularly 
effective medium for transmitting territory-related burdens at the core 
of the state’s business—namely, infrastructure, defense, peace, and 
good order.  After all, a state is just the political authority that regu-
lates and coordinates the activity of people within its claimed territory.51  
 
50 We thus see governance through holders of other forms of property rights, like 
patents, whose holders bear the burden of fulfilling some of the burdens of modern 
progressive states relating to innovation and education.  While I am grateful to Hanoch 
Dagan and Bob Ellickson for pressing me on this point, I leave full consideration of govern-
ing through this and other forms of property to another day, if only because it introduces 
new controversies over the scope of the state’s responsibility and mandate to govern. 
51 See GREEN, supra note 31, at 71-72 (stressing the centrality of authority to the idea 
of the state).  
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Its most basic purpose is to establish itself as the supreme political au-
thority capable of maintaining order within its boundaries.52  
Indeed, a country is stateless if those claiming political authority 
are unable, in fact, to establish a civil society—i.e. the basic order that 
enables people to carry on with their lives.53  The most basic things that 
states need to do to establish a civil society include securing the state 
against external and internal threats to peace and order and providing 
the infrastructure to enable the movement of people (and their goods) 
within a territory.54  Justice and human flourishing might require much 
more than this, such as the regulation of markets, safeguards against 
poverty, universal education, support for the arts, etc.55  But my claim 
here is just that the provision of at least these three kinds of goods—
(1) secure frontiers, (2) peace and order within state boundaries, and 
(3) basic infrastructure that allows people and goods to penetrate into 
the farthest reaches of its territory—is constitutive of even the most 
basic claims of political authority with respect to a given territory.  
Seen this way, the provision of this most basic order throughout its 
territory is a survival condition of a state.56  Core aspects of state busi-
ness thus inevitably have a territorial component. 
 
52 See, e.g., Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 
372 (1978) (“The object of the rule of law is to substitute for violence peaceful ways of 
settling disputes.”). 
53 What civil society fully requires is, of course, a subject of normative, moral, and 
political inquiry, and I do not attempt to answer that here. 
54 Even libertarians sign on to at least this basic conception of the state’s role.  See, 
e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Living Dangerously:  A Defense of Mortal Peril, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 
909, 911 (acknowledging “standard public goods” such as “law enforcement, public 
roads, and defense”).  For a discussion of the normative underpinnings of the state’s 
job to provide roads and defense in Kant’s political philosophy, see RIPSTEIN, supra 
note 43, at 238, and Larissa Katz, Ownership and Social Solidarity, 17 LEGAL THEORY 119, 
124 (2011).  For an economic conception of infrastructure as a public good, see Carol 
Rose, The Comedy of the Commons:  Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 711 (1986).  
55 Since the middle ages, states have considered it their duty to regulate markets.  
Cf. HARTOG, supra note 44, at 33-43 (analogizing the “early American city” to the “me-
dieval English borough,” in that the “city government . . . ha[d] no proper sphere be-
yond the regulation of economic activity”).  The modern state has assumed a much 
expanded mandate. 
56 For views on the autonomy of the state to pursue ends independent of any par-
ticular set of private interests, see LEVI, supra note 2, at 186-88; Peter B. Evans et al., On 
the Road Toward a More Adequate Understanding of the State, in BRINGING THE STATE BACK 
IN, supra note 14, at 347, 350-54, and Dietrich Rueschemeyer & Peter B. Evans, The State 
and Economic Transformation:  Toward an Analysis of the Conditions Underlying Effective In-
tervention, in BRINGING THE STATE BACK IN, supra, at 44, 63-68.  For an additional view 
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A country is “stateless,” or is stateless in part, where it is unable to 
carry out its basic functions.  A state may survive in part even as it fails 
elsewhere.  An otherwise strong state may exhibit pockets of weakness 
in anywhere from its frontiers to its “core” territory.  Governing 
through owners enhances state capabilities by enabling the state to 
function beyond the reach of its central institutions.  It ensures that 
there is someone in place to perform state roles and responsibilities 
such as road-building, frontier defense, and the management of local 
disputes, each of which must be performed locally.  As the state de-
fines its core aims differently, to include health, education, and wel-
fare—functions less territorially defined—the comparative advantage 
of governing through owners as against other modes of governance, 
such as through bureaucracy or license, will decrease. 
B.  Distributing Burdens to Local Offices 
The territorial dimension of land has certain crucial advantages 
that facilitate the effective distribution of government burdens to 
owners.  Recall the theater analogy and, specifically, the advantages 
associated with drawing up a seating chart for a theater and assigning 
specific seats to purchasers of tickets.57  This practice lets a theater 
manager articulate obligations in general terms while picking out 
specific obligees.  In the example, everyone is responsible for putting 
out fires under her own seat.  The discussion above drew attention 
primarily to how assigned seating conveys information about who is 
obliged to do what.  But note also how this practice gives content to the 
obligation itself.  The sale of a ticket to seat J3 qualifies a general obliga-
tion to put out fires in terms of space and time; it thus not only tells us 
who should take care of a fire but also tells us which fires ought to con-
cern that person—those, and only those, located under J3.  What re-
sults is a system of fire control for the entire theater.  Assuming a full 
house, there is someone to put out a fire no matter where it starts.   
 Similar advantages arise where roles and responsibilities graft on-
to a system of private property.  This is clearest with property rights in 
land, where the position of owner is defined in relation to a particular 
slice of the state’s territory.  The owner in charge of a particular place 
can be assigned jobs in that particular place.  
 
on how the government relies for its power on the economic pursuits of the governed, 
see GIANFRANCO POGGI, FORMS OF POWER 144-45 (2001).   
57 See supra Section I.B. 
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Cities, for example, link the burden of clearing snow to ownership 
for precisely this reason.  Assume that public sidewalks abut mostly 
private property.58  Coupling snow-removal duties with private owner-
ship immediately provides the city with an army of snow shovelers, who 
are in place before any snow even falls.  As one court noted:   
The assistance to the city which is obtained under ordinances making it 
the duty of abutters to remove snow and ice from the sidewalks adjoining 
their property relieves, to that extent, the burdens of labor and expense 
which it otherwise would necessarily, in discharge of its municipal duties, 
be subjected to . . . .
59
  
In another case, the New York Court of Appeals noted frankly that, 
while cities were responsible for enabling pedestrian passage, “[i]t is 
not expected, and cannot be required, that the corporation shall itself 
forthwith employ laborers to clean all the walks, and so accomplish the 
object by a slow and expensive process, when the result may be effect-
ed more swiftly and easily by imposing that duty upon the citizens.”60  
A system of property rights in land thus helps states to govern locally by 
attaching jobs that need to be done locally, such as road construction 
or border defense, to ownership of land.61      
 
58 Of course, there are sidewalks in front of public property too.  The comprehen-
sive nature of a snow-removal plan that relies on owners is a function of the extent to 
which sidewalks in a city abut private land. 
59 Willoughby v. City of New Haven, 97 A. 85, 88 (Conn. 1937); see also Fields v. City 
of Leavenworth, 58 P.2d 1065, 1068 (Kan. 1936) (“The ice was removed much more 
promptly by the tenant than the city possibly could have removed it from every side-
walk . . . under the conditions which then obtained.”). 
60 Taylor v. City of Yonkers, 11 N.E. 642, 642 (N.Y. 1887). 
61 While governing through owners is generally done on a modest scale in modern 
states, states still impose burdens on owners relating to core state functions, such as 
maintaining infrastructure, see supra notes 7-9, or maintaining peace and order, such as 
the obligations of mall owners in some jurisdictions to provide policing services to pre-
vent third-party assaults, see, e.g., Seibert v. Vic Regnier Builders, Inc., 856 P.2d 1332, 
1338-40 (Kan. 1993) (considering the liability of mall owners for failing to prevent 
criminal assaults by third parties).  There are other examples of states using owners to 
assist in government projects.  See, e.g., Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9625 (2006) (holding owners responsi-
ble for cleaning up pollutants whether or not they caused the problem).  Private 
owners are also drafted to further the purposes of the federal government in the En-
dangered Species Act:  they are required not to use their land in a way that harms, har-
asses, or kills endangered or threatened species as defined under the Act.  16 U.S.C. 
§ 1538(a)(1)(B). 
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IV.  STATE-OWNER RELATIONS:  A NEW MODEL 
 What do formal private property rights mean for our relationship 
with the state?  The answer for many policymakers is, simply, greater 
freedom from state interference.62  Formal private property rights 
guarantee a space for individuals to make self-serving decisions apart 
from the public sphere in which the state operates.  The struggle for 
power between owners and the state is thus analyzed primarily in terms 
of control over resources:  when resources are in private hands, there is 
a diminution of public power, and vice versa.  This logic has led some 
policymakers to overemphasize certain risks the state poses to owners.  
For example, the primary concern for many policymakers in interna-
tional development has been to determine how to keep resources in 
the private sphere and out of state hands and, more generally, how to 
convince nervous investors that a state’s commitment to protecting 
private property rights is genuine.63  
This conventional view of state-owner relations—shared by theo-
rists and policymakers across the political spectrum—-fails us in two 
ways.  First, it prevents a clear view of the range of governance strate-
gies available to a state.  Governing through owners—not as familiar as 
governing through license or bureaucracy—is an important and dis-
tinct mode of governance that does not fit with the logic of liberalism 
(classical and egalitarian alike).  Instead, from the viewpoint of classical 
liberalism, state demands on owners register purely as infringements 
on a “private” sphere.64  Prominent libertarian theorists like Richard 
Epstein and politicians like Senator Orrin Hatch argue that the state 
acts improperly, even predatorily, when it places a disproportionate 
 
62 See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
63 See, e.g., KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 94 (2010) 
(“[H]ost countries are more likely to attract technology intensive foreign direct invest-
ment if they have developed legal systems that protect property rights . . . .”); LOUIS T. 
WELLS & RAFIQ AHMED, MAKING FOREIGN INVESTMENT SAFE:  PROPERTY RIGHTS AND 
NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY 295 (2007) (discussing the impact of property rights on inter-
national trade).  On the propensity of states to prey on the wealth of subjects and its 
effect on economic development, see, for example, STEPHEN HABER ET AL., THE POLI-
TICS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS:  POLITICAL INSTABILITY, CREDIBLE COMMITMENTS, AND ECO-
NOMIC GROWTH IN MEXICO, 1876–1929, at 19 (2003), DOUGLASS C. NORTH, 
INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 59 (1990), and 
WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2002:  BUILDING INSTITUTIONS FOR MAR-
KETS 99 (2002). 
64 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 5-6 (noting that “classical liberalism” valued, above 
all, individual freedom from state authority). 
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share of social burdens on citizens who own property.65  In their view, 
states looking to outsource core state burdens should respect the in-
tegrity of the private sphere by bargaining for the services of private 
actors and then governing by license.    
From the viewpoint of egalitarian liberalism, holding owners re-
sponsible for core state functions is problematic because it pushes pri-
vate actors into “public” roles, without the oversight or public law 
constraints that apply when government employees do the job.  Many 
egalitarian liberals think that certain functions are for the state alone to 
discharge, which they interpret to require governing by bureaucracy.66  
Each of these divergent viewpoints, however, overlooks the fit between 
ownership and governance.  Rather than recognizing governing 
through owners as a distinct governance strategy, they merely explain 
its various manifestations as piecemeal deviations from these other 
more familiar modes of governance. 
Second, the conventional view that formal private property repre-
sents a transfer of power from state to individual weakens our under-
standing of how the balance of power between state and owners might 
be managed.  Policymakers have pressed consistently in the direction 
of an ever-expanded private sphere in order to offset the power of the 
state.67  But freedom from state domination might just as well lie in 
one of two other directions:  (1) in mutual dependence, where the state 
depends on owners to perform core functions just as owners depend on 
the state to protect their rights; or (2) in independence, through exit 
 
65 See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS:  PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMI-
NENT DOMAIN 161-62 (1985) (criticizing an understanding of eminent domain that 
includes an overly broad conception of “public use”); Nancie G. Marzulla, The Property 
Rights Movement:  How It Began and Where It is Headed (labeling environmental regulation 
of property rights an “intrusion into ordinary life”), in LAND RIGHTS:  THE 1990S’ PROP-
ERTY RIGHTS REBELLION 1, 5 (Bruce Yandle ed., 1995); Orrin G. Hatch, Foreword to 
NANCIE G. MARZULLA & ROGER J. MARZULLA, PROPERTY RIGHTS:  UNDERSTANDING 
GOVERNMENT TAKINGS AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, at ix, ix (1997) (asserting 
that property rights are “under attack from the regulatory state”). 
66 GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT:  OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 4-5 
( Jody Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009) (listing several hazards of investing state 
power in private parties); PAUL R. VERKUIL, OUTSOURCING SOVEREIGNTY:  WHY PRIVATI-
ZATION OF GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS THREATENS DEMOCRACY AND WHAT WE CAN DO 
ABOUT IT 121 (2007) (“[C]ertain government functions may be so fundamental as not 
to be transferable to private hands under any circumstances.”).  Kantians also resist the 
privatization of core state functions on noninstrumental grounds.  See Thorburn, supra 
note 4, at 441-42 (arguing that privatization of state functions would undermine the 
purpose of the state). 
67 See supra note 2. 
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from the formal sphere where the state guarantees our property 
rights—to an informal sector in which third-party collective-action 
mechanisms perform that service.  My model of state-owner relations 
exposes how states incorporate owners into a system of governance 
and also reveals the vulnerability of owners isolated in a formal, state-
defined private sphere.   
A.  Mutual Dependence   
 Let us take a particularly dramatic state function, the securing of 
territorial boundaries.  Western history is full of examples of states 
using owners to defend frontiers.68  Romans granted land on the fron-
tiers of their empire to former legionaries, who then served as the first 
line of defense against barbarian hordes.69  William the Conqueror 
granted land in England to his knights in return for military service.70  
The Habsburgs created a defensive screen against the threat of a Turk-
ish invasion by putting military settlers, the Grenzer, in place on the 
borderlands in Croatia.71  More recently, in colonial America, the trus-
tees of Georgia—themselves owners charged with governance func-
tions—handed out property rights, locked in fee tail, to settlers from 
England as a means of creating a buffer against Native American 
 
68 I will put aside for now a related phenomenon:  states that control property 
rights on frontiers not only frequently extract positive services from owners, such as 
military service, but also the very fact of state control over property on the frontiers has, 
in some contexts, preempted the associations (gesellschaften) that might otherwise create 
informal rights and thus acquire a kind of political authority that threatens the state’s own. 
69 See, e.g., Gabriele Wesch-Klein, Recruits and Veterans (relating that veterans were 
sometimes settled “in areas that had belonged to the Roman Empire for only a short 
while” because “war-hardened veterans could make a real contribution to the defense 
of their new homes in an emergency.”), in A COMPANION TO THE ROMAN ARMY 435, 444 
(Paul Erdkamp ed., 2007). 
70 Mark A. Senn, English Life and Law in the Time of the Black Death, 38 REAL PROP. 
PROB. & TR. J. 507, 540 (2003). 
71 Gunther E. Rothenberg, The Origins of the Austrian Military Frontier in Croatia and 
the Alleged Treaty of 22 December 1522, 38 SLAVONIC & E. EUR. REV. 493, 493 (1960); see 
also GUNTHER E. ROTHENBERG, THE MILITARY BORDER IN CROATIA 1740–1881:  A STUDY 
OF AN IMPERIAL INSTITUTION 6-70 (1966) (discussing the role of settlers that served as 
“[m]ilitary colonists” in various empires and focusing on the role of the Grenzer in the 
Habsburg Empire); John Childs, Debate, A Short History of the Military Use of Land in 
Peacetime, 4 WAR HIST. 81, 83-84 (1997) (“[T]he Grenzer[] were settled in this region 
and, in return for land, performed military service . . . .”). 
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attack on the frontiers.72  Naturally, a human line of defense required 
a certain density of population.  Too few owners in place would render 
the state vulnerable to an attack.  The trustees of Georgia ensured that 
they would have enough owners in place on the frontiers by granting 
land subject to entailment.  Since land in fee tail could not be freely 
sold off, there could be no changes to lot size or to the number of 
owners required to do the job.73 
Owners who performed crucial state functions also acquired a 
countervailing power because states depended on them to stay.  In 
some contexts, military settlers exploited this relationship of mutual 
dependence to claim a share in government power more generally.  
The Grenzer, for instance, owed military service to the Habsburgs, but 
were able to lay claim as a result to general governance powers in the 
borderlands.74  A relationship of mutual dependence emerged and 
lasted for centuries.75   
On both sides of the state-owner relationship, however, there are 
incentives to escape dependence.  Sometimes the owners find ways to 
take the benefits of ownership but leave the burdens behind, such as 
by exploiting external circumstances that make states vulnerable to the 
demands of owners.  Settlers on the Georgia frontier, for instance, 
pressed successfully for the abolition of entail and thus retained the 
full economic benefits of ownership with none of the restrictions that 
tied them and their families to the land.76  
At other times, it is the state that escapes dependence on owners 
and reclaims power for itself by relying on other governance strategies 
while simultaneously stripping owners of responsibility for core state 
functions.  When states remove public functions from the office of 
ownership, they also strip the governance power that owners enjoyed 
within a relationship of mutual dependence.  In late feudal England, 
the emerging state ceased to rely on manorial landlords to provide 
core state functions.  For example, royal courts began to take over the 
 
72 Claire Priest, Understanding the End of Entail:  Information, Institutions, and 
Slavery in the American Revolutionary Period 38 (Feb. 2010) (unpublished manu-
script) (on file with author). 
73 Id. 
74 See ROTHENBERG, supra note 71, at 8 (noting the “substantial privileges” afforded 
the Grenzer for their service). 
75 Id. 
76 See Priest, supra note 72, at 38-40 (recounting the Georgia settlers’ campaign to 
eliminate entail that resulted in a provision in the Georgia Constitution to that effect).   
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jurisdiction previously reserved to manorial courts.77  By the late 
twelfth century, the Crown had begun to assert the power to define 
and protect property rights generally.78  By the thirteenth century, the 
Crown had moved from merely enforcing property rights defined by 
manorial law to claiming sole authority to enforce and define all prop-
erty rights and so to create new forms of tenure.79  The manorial lords, 
though still themselves vulnerable to the Crown’s authority to define 
their rights and the incidents of tenure, were ultimately stripped of 
their power and responsibility to resolve local property disputes, an 
important role in a system of governance.80  Thus over time, the mutual 
dependence of owners and states was dislodged as owners became vul-
nerable to a state that did not in turn depend on them. 
As a state turns to employees and mercenaries to govern, it ceases to 
depend on owners to carry out its core business.  Mutual dependence of 
state and owners, by contrast, serves as a simple form of constraint on 
the arbitrary or predatory exercise of power by the state over owners.   
 
77 J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 226 (2002).  For 
discussions of the role of manorial courts, see MILSOM, supra note 45 at 11, 88-89, 
FRANK STENTON, THE FIRST CENTURY OF ENGLISH FEUDALISM 1066–1166, at 55-56 
(1961), and Paul R. Hyams, Warranty and Good Lordship in Twelfth Century England, 5 
LAW & HIST. REV. 437, 447-50 (1987). 
78 The Crown began to take over the definition and enforcement of property rights 
with Henry II’s Constitution of Clarendon in 1164.  It was then that Glanvill introduced 
the idea of centralized legal authority:  “[N]o man need answer in any court for his 
freehold land unless commanded to do so by the King’s writ.”  SIMPSON, supra note 34, 
at 24.  Protection against disseissin in royal courts further eroded manorial jurisdic-
tions.  See BERMAN, supra note 16, at 456 (calling the protection “one of Henry II’s great 
devices for wresting jurisdiction” from the feudal courts); see also John S. Beckerman, 
Procedural Innovation and Institutional Change in Medieval English Manorial Courts, 10 LAW 
& HIST. REV. 197, 200 (1992) (“As the need for seigniorial jurisdiction faded in the late 
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the quality of justice dispensed in manor courts also 
declined.”).  On what this meant for the concept of ownership in English law, see 
Woodbridge v. Bardolf, (1194), reprinted in 1 ROTULI CURIAE REGIS:  ROLLS AND RECORDS 
OF THE COURT HELD BEFORE THE KING’S JUSTICIARS OR JUSTICES 48 (Francis Palgrave 
ed., 1835), translated in S.A. REILLY, OUR LEGAL HERITAGE:  KING AETHELBERT, 596, TO 
KING GEORGE III, 1776, at 121 (2012); and BERMAN, supra note 16, at 446-49. 
79 See Quia Emptores Terrarum, 1290, 18 Edw., ch. 1 (removing restrictions on land 
transfer to provide tenants with more freedom to alienate their land).   
80 As the Crown took over the protection and definition of property rights, every-
one in effect became tenants in capite.  See BAKER, supra note 77, at 237 ( “[B]y the thir-
teenth century the tenant was in reality the owner of the land.”). 
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B.  Exit to the Informal Sector 
Access to nonstate sources for the protection of property rights in 
the informal sector allows owners to remain independent from the 
state altogether.  The choice owners face then is not between holding 
property and remaining property-less but rather between holding 
property protected by the state and holding it under some other 
collective-action mechanism.81  If the state is successful, there is no 
parallel world in which some nonstate authority provides the function-
al equivalent of formal private property rights.   
Of course, not all states will be entirely successful in this regard.  
Not all can maintain a monopoly on the supply of property rights 
throughout their territory.  Dissident groups, customary or tribal authori-
ties, or other collective-action mechanisms that crudely approximate 
civil society in areas beyond the reach of the state may serve as other 
sources of authority in pockets of the state’s territory.82  In such cir-
cumstances there may well be a viable informal sector that roughly 
replicates the types of entitlements that owners expect the state to 
supply.83  It is important to note, however, that what is often called the 
“informal sphere” is rarely a neat parallel world in which rival political 
or social institutions establish the functional equivalents of formal 
property rights.  Instead, those rights are often significantly degraded,84 
depending on first- or second-party enforcers and brute force rather 
 
81 This introduces a new form of vulnerability as nonstate collective-action mecha-
nisms acquire leverage over owners.  Any practical understanding of the extent and 
nature of this vulnerability—and whether it is in fact preferable to vulnerability to the 
state—turns on context-specific factors, including the kind of authority the collective-
action mechanism claims over people and territory and the incentives it has to exercise 
that power.   
82 Informal collective-action mechanisms include customary tribal authorities, vol-
untary associations, and even organized criminal organization that in some places 
effectively rule over mini-territories within a state’s territory.  See, e.g., David B. Schorr, 
Appropriation as Agrarianism:  Distributive Justice in the Creation of Property Rights, 32 ECOL-
OGY L.Q. 3, 7-11 (2005) (summarizing the creation and application of the ad hoc prop-
erty codes that developed among miners at the time of the Gold Rush); Mattathias 
Schwartz, A Massacre in Jamaica, NEW YORKER, Dec. 12, 2011, at 62, 64-65 (“Many of 
Jamaica’s low-income communities are still led by dons, whose organizations act like 
miniature states:  allocating benefits, defending borders, and extracting taxes.”). 
83 See ELLICKSON, supra note 12, at 139-40 (arguing that property arrangements are 
possible—even common—in the absence of state-backed rights). 
84 See, e.g., Jedediah Purdy, A Freedom-Promoting Approach to Property:  A Renewed Tradi-
tion for New Debates, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1237, 1267 (2005) (describing informal property 
rights as possessory rights with limited exchange value as defined by the particular in-
formal network).   
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than law.  The risk of state domination may nevertheless push some 
owners to abandon the formal sector in favor of even a degraded form 
of possession in the informal sphere.85  This explains the otherwise 
puzzling situation in which there are few takers for formal property 
rights as resource users look instead to self-help or to organized crime 
to acquire and hold on to their possessions.86  The possibility of exit to 
the informal sphere alleviates dependence on the state and under-
mines the state’s power to set the “price” for formal property rights.  
The dependence of owners on the state is thus a function of the state’s 
monopoly on the supply of property rights within its territory.87 
CONCLUSION 
This Article concerns the political uses of private property rights.  
While property’s economic uses have often been addressed,88 few 
scholars have considered the political uses of a system of property 
 
85 I have argued elsewhere that this explains phenomena like the persistence of in-
formal kiosks in places like post-Soviet Russia where formal ownership represents vul-
nerability to the state.  See Katz, supra note 12, at 112 (“Moscow storefronts in the 
1990s . . . were left unused while Russia made the transition to capitalism because too 
many regulatory and private entities had the power to veto any particular use . . . of 
these storefronts.” (citing Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons:  Property in 
the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 633-42 (1998))). 
86 See, e.g., Daniel Fitzpatrick, Evolution and Chaos in Property Rights Systems:  The Third 
World Tragedy of Contested Access, 115 YALE L.J. 996, 1010 (2006) (arguing that, in the 
absence of social order, people will “resort to competing legal, normative, and coali-
tional enforcement mechanisms”); cf. Benito Arruñada & Nuno Garoupa, The Choice of 
Titling System in Land, 48 J.L. & ECON. 709, 719-20 (2005) (suggesting that property 
owners may eschew formal state protections when they are too costly).  
87 There are echoes in this claim of Barzel’s attempt to define the scope of the state 
in terms of its power to enforce contracts within a region.  BARZEL, supra note 32, at 23. 
88 See DE SOTO, supra note 33, at 63 (”Property . . . is not mere paper but a mediat-
ing device that captures and stores most of the stuff required to make a market economy 
run.”); DOUGLASS C. NORTH, STRUCTURE AND CHANGE IN ECONOMIC HISTORY 6 (1981) 
(“The security of property rights has been a critical determinant of the rate of saving 
and capital formation.”); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 32 (6th ed. 
2003) (“[L]egal protection of property rights creates incentives to exploit resources 
efficiently.”); ADOLF WEBER, IN DEFENCE OF CAPITALISM 30-34 (H.J. Stenning trans., 
1930) (explaining the economic significance of property rights).  Theorists who ex-
plore the link between ownership and economic growth assume that formal property 
rights are more effective than informal property rights.  See DE SOTO, supra note 1, at 
158-63 (asserting that formal property rights lead individuals to use resources more 
efficiently).  But see Michael Trebilcock & Paul-Erik Veel, Property Rights and Devel-
opment:  The Contingent Case for Formalization, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 397, 453 (2008) 
(challenging the assumption that formal property rights are necessarily more effi-
cient than informal ones). 
Katz Revised Final.docx (DO NOT DELETE)  5/30/2012 7:57 PM 
2012] Governing Through Owners 2059 
 
rights from the perspective of state functioning.  Those who write 
about the “public nature” of ownership have been concerned primarily 
with its uses as a tool for achieving moral ends, for example a more 
distributively just or virtuous society.89  My aim has not been to join 
debates in moral philosophy about how we might justify particular 
burdens that states impose on owners.  Rather, it has been to describe 
in a new way the basic building blocks of state-owner relations and so 
to illuminate the phenomenon of governing through owners.   
The phenomenon of governing through owners is pervasive.  It 
suggests a political role for private property rights not usually accounted 
for in the normal discourse about property and freedom.  The usual 
view of the balance of power between state and owners suggests that 
the state cedes ground to owners when it defines and protects private 
property rights.  But the special uses of a system of private property 
rights as a tool for governance suggests that this is not at all the whole 
story.  States gain power too when they guarantee property rights. It is 
not enough to consider the contrast between private and public owner-
ship, and what this means for our freedom to make certain kinds of 
decisions for ourselves—that is, to set private agendas for things.  We 
need also to think about the contrast between formal and informal own-
ership, and what this means for our vulnerability to the state and its 
demands.   Private property rights do not straightforwardly constrain 
state power; in some circumstances, they enhance it.   
 
89 See, e.g., J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT:  FLORENTINE POLITICAL 
THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION 463 (1975) (considering the 
function of property in affirming liberty and autonomy); Gregory S. Alexander & 
Eduardo M. Peñalver, Properties of Community, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 127, 137 
(2009) (suggesting that the distribution of property rights be judged “by the degree to 
which they” make possible greater “human flourishing”); Hanoch Dagan, Takings and 
Distributive Justice, 85 VA. L. REV. 741, 768-78 (1999) (offering a theory of takings law 
“that accommodates the values of social responsibility”). 
